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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

fLOYD E. HARMSTON,
Plaintiff/appellant,

Supreme Court No. 19297

vs.
T.

R.

HARMSTON,
Defendant/respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff Floyd E. Harmston
to set aside deeds granting a remainding interest in certain oil
eights to his brother, T. R. Harmston.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court on January 17, 1983.
From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and cancellation
of the deeds
;i

new trial.

in question as a matter of law, or in the alternative,

STi\TE:·1E:JT OF F/\:'TS
Floyd Hannston
originall; from Roosevelt,

(plaintiff-apoellant herein) •.,·cis

but spent mnst of his

Following his wife's death in 1979,

Utah.

and returned to Roosevelt to live.
Harmston

(respondent herein),

life in Provo,

he left Provo

Plaintiff's brother,

also lived in Roosevelt

the Swruner and into the Fall of 1980,
regular company of his brother,

( R.

Respondent played a role in this mistaken belief
certain extent encouraged the misunderstanding

about his assets

(R.

:r. ;

138,

(R.
(R.

(R.

138, tr.
126

138,

1980, plaintiff was also

0

I
tr.

Jer; conLo':

138).

On October 2,
deeds at issue.

.J)i.

plaintiff developed an obse',

belief that his adopted son was stealing from him

During August and September,

(R .

the plaintiff '.vas in t!'e

the respondent.

During August and September of 1980,

r.

1980,

the plaintiff executed the ·,;ill ac,;

Attorney Dennis L.

Draney helped plaintiff

prepare a new will as well as the conveying instruments

(R. 11]'

Attorney Draney recalled that the plaintiff was confused ourrna , .. ,
period of time he wished to make the conveyance to respondent, e:
for this reason

Draney required plaintiff to return several

times before he allowed the execution of the will and deeds to
place

(R.

138,

tr.

169,

and after October 2,

181-182 I.

1980,

.o

The olaintiff intended both 2°'·

that his estate and inheritance na'.:'o'.'-

pass to his adopted son Howard Blumer and then to his gr3r,,lch:'.cc
(R.

5) .

Only for a short two month period did :)laintiff mio'=a:•.o'.

believe his adopted son

stealing from

his adopted son Bhould receive no 1nher1t3nce.
deeds

1n questinn had the effect of

-1-

and that

edopted son and grandchildren, of a substantial portion of
.; .•state.

When shortly thereafter plaintiff asked respondent to

""'urn the deeds, respondent refused.

Plaintiff then directed Attorney

Hall to prepare an affidavit for him.
•ct0ber

Eleven days later, on

13, plaintiff executed the affidavit, recanting the October

1980 deed

(R. 5).

In March, 1981, this action was brought by the plaintiff
tu

set aside the inadvertant conveyance to respondent.

In /lay,

1982, First Security Bank was appointed conservator for plaintiff's

ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT'S MISREPRESENTATION THAT PLAINTIFF'S
ADOPTED SON WAS TAKING PLAINTIFF'S ASSETS CREATED
A MATERIAL MISTAKE OF FACT IN THE MIND OF
PLAINTIFF AND REQUIRES THAT THE DEEDS CONVEYED
TO RESPONDENT BE CANCELLED.

The reason given by the respondent for plaintiff's recon"eyance of deeds originally held for his adopted son, Howard Blumer, is
plaintiff's apparent belief during August and Seoternber of 1980, that
"1r. Blumer was stealing monthly payments being paid into trust by the
8Urchaser of the petitioner's former residence.

Yet respondent actively

encouraged plaintiff in this mistaken belief by making such comments as
"Howard has jumped the gun.

Hell, it all belonged to him anyway" and

"I don't know why he'd want to do that"

(R. 138, Respondent's testimony

3tl7-18).

Plaintiff's deposition, republished as part of the record in
lieu of plaintiff's testimony at trial

(R. 126), indicates the

did persuade the plaintiff to mistakenly believe that
Howard Blumer was stealing from the petitioner:
Q.
What if anything did he (the respondent) tell you
about reasons for signing the mineral interests to him?

-3-

A.

\\ell,

as I

told '/OU,

c011•.='d ar.2

'.1e

me that Howard was going to steal evPr;thing that r
So I got to thinking about it, ,rnd I +:hnught, 'AT•ell, 'ci·
what he's (Howard's) thinking.
(R.

126, Plaintiff's deposition at

8).

In spite of this evidence of respondents overreachico
and misrepresentations to the plaintiff,

the trial court fa1lQ'

find that the respondent in any way attempted to persuarle o!ai··.·
that his adopted son was not acting in plaintiff's best interes·
No Utah Courts have addressed the issue whether a .- 8 r,"e.:
based on a unilateral mistake of fact may be set aside.
rule, however,

T'.te ge:.E:·

is clear: courts have authority to cancel a con'.'e"·

if it is occassioned by a unilateral and material mistake cf c•::
in the granter.

As stated in 23 Am Jur 2d Deeds,

§

157:

of equity will cancel a deed for material mistake of
granter"; and in 23 Am Jur 2d Deeds,

§

155:

ciace :,

"Mistake of fact:

ic:,

however, a well recognized ground for interposition of a
equity."
Courts of Oklahoma and Colorado have set aside ccn•:e"3C:'
when the Granter was acting upon a unilateral and material
fact.

In \'lomble v. Mahoney,

383 P.2d 26, 29

(Okla.

:96Ji,

a

conveyance was cancelled because it was based upon a unilatera:
mistake of fact going to the essence.

The Oklahoma court -.,en' :·

state that a case for recission and cancellation was made stron,e:
where the unilateral mistake of fact was

3

result of

(even an innocent misrepresentation) by the nther party.
Colorado rule was reaffirmed i'1 Tilbuc:

)si'1unCson,

1

(Colo. 1964) as follows:
Equitable relief will be

when the fact concern1no
made is material to

- .j-

:n -1ses nf

tne

352 ?

substance and not merely its incidence, and the
mistake itself is so important that it determines the
conduct of the mistaken parties.
Like \·lomble, even if respondent's comments to the
111ntiff regarding plaintiff's stepson were innocently made, the
,»n'ie·;ance to respondent should be cancelled because the ensuing
of fact upon which plaintiff acted went to the essence of
tee transaction.

Like Tilbury, plaintiff was so misled that his

mistaken belief determined his conduct.
his stepson was stealing from him.

Plaintiff actually was convinced

This belief was the sole reason for

tne plaintiff's actions to change the disposition of his property upon
This belief was either initiated by respondent or at least

lus death.

encouraged by respondent.
In Dreyer v. Dreyer, 617 P.2d 955

(Oregon 1980),

the court said fraud, duress, undue influence and misrepresentation
are concepts used to void conveyances, especially where lack of
given by the grantee supports a finding that the transaction is unconscionable.

In the instant matter, plaintiff made the

conveyance only because he was mistaken in believing his stepson was
stealing from him.

This alone is grounds for recission, but is

strengthened by the fact that respondent encouraged this belief
his actions and therefore perpetuated the misconception and
tuok the deeds without giving consideration.
For these reasons, plaintiff was seriously mistaken and
as to a material fact, at the time of the conveyance to
respondent.

His mistake went to the very essence of the transaction

,nd determined plaintiff's conduct on October 2, 1980, and has
in a partial disinheritance of plaintiff's adopted son and
lJren.

- 5-

II.

RESPONDENT'S CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP \'iITH
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S
SPIRIT
AT THE TIME THE DEEDS \VERE EXECUTED SUPPORT A
PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE nJFLUEnCE.

When the deeds in question were executed on October 2.
1980, plaintiff and respondent had recently been spending an

unprecedented amount of time together.

Prior to the summer of

1980, respondent testified he had visited the plaintiff in Prove

5 or 6 times in 30 years

(R.

138,

tr.

24).

The apparent

between the parties prior to August, 1980 finds support in the
plaintiff's sworn testimony as follows:
What was the relationship with your brother, let's
say for a one-year period before the signing of these
mineral deeds? How did you get along with him?
Q.

A.
Well, I got along with him all right.
Because we
never saw one another. I didn't give a damn for him.
(R. 126 Plaintiff's Deposition at 6-7)
By September of 1980, however, the respondent was even accompan,·i::
plaintiff on errands which were within walking distance of plaint:':
Roosevelt residence.

For example, on at least one occassion the

visited a bank within walking distance from plaintiff's residence,
to have respondent's name entered in rlace of plaintiff's stepsc.'
name on plaintiff's bank account

(R.

138,

0

Respondent's testimon:· ,.

46-47).

While these events were taking place, plaintiff continued
in a delicate state of mental health as a result of aging.

:-

Dur1M

August and September of 1980, respondent established a relation°:-with plaintiff which enabled respondent to exercise superior1t
influence over plaintiff by accomranyina plaintiff
respondent was able to

rn1srepresentat1ons to plaint1tf

confidence and to encouraging misunderstandings.

-6-

1'

The general rule as to when the law raises a preswnption of
url'iue influence is as follows:
\'/here a confidential relation
between the parties to a deed
grantee
. is the dominant
transaction, the law raises a
influence.
21

Am

Jur 2d Deeds,

§

is shown to exist
and where the
spirit in the
preswntion of undue

149.

The Utah Supreme Court has applied a similar rule.

'me"·

In Seequist v.

Seequist, 524 P.2d 598

(Utah 1974), the Utah court

found that a confidential relationship existed between a mother
and son, and went on to rule that a conveyance of property for a
sum not approximating fair market value was a breach of the relationship and required that the conveyance be set aside.
Christensen,

And in Blankenship v.

622 P.2d 806 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court found

that a husband and wife relationship and a grantor's mental incapacity
supported a finding that the conveyance was procurred by undue
influence.
t:'.:

The Blankenship court also found that a grantor with a

delicate mental condition was more susceptable to undue inf 1 uence
from a person in whom he placed confidence.

In other words, once

2,

a confidential relation is established, the likelihood of finding

n'!

that the grantee is a dominant spirit is increased, especially where,

,.

as in the instant case, the grantor has a delicate mental condition.
Plaintiff obviously reposed great confidence in the

c ·-

respondent just prior to the conveyance on October 2, 1980.

na

:acts indicate plaintiff was constantly asking respondent to take
him on errands and even on long trips

2·.'

at 41-42).

The

(R. 138, Respondent's testimony

Plaintiff even displayed his personal assets before the
(R. 138, Respondent's testimony at 13-14).

Based on

;;ec:quist and Blankenship, a confidential relationship existed between
;la1ntiff and respondent.

Respondent was able to easily influence
-7-

and persuade the plaintiff, who was the respondent's older brothet
by nearly 13 years.

Indeed, a sibling relationship alone has uPe·

enough for some courts to find that a confidential relationship
existed between the
270

parties.

See Roberts v. HUPlphreys,

356 P .. ·

(Okla. 1960).
The trial court,

however,

refused to find either that a

confidential relationship existed between the parties or that the
respondent was the dominant spirit.

The court ignored plaintiff' 5

testimony, evidence of his delicate mental condition, and the fact
that his property was conveyed to the respondent for no consident_··
The lower court incorrectly required the plaintiff, rather than tc.e
respondent, to bear the burden of proof.

The burden should have '"'

placed on respondent, by virtue of his confidential relation to
plaintiff and the complete lack of consideration given for the deec
Had the burden been placed on the respondent,

the circumstantial

evidence introduced by plaintiff in the lower court would not have
needed to show respondent's overreaching by clear and convincing
evidence; rather, plaintiff only would have been required to raise
an inference of overreaching and undue influence on the respondent's
part. Against this standard, plaintiff's evidence raises a preswnp: ..
in the respondent.

Respondent should be made to rebut this presJr.c·

Other courts have reversed decisions grounded upon impr::'
placing the burden of proof upon the grantor.
272 P. 2d 298

In Mc!'Jabb v. Brewstc•

(Idaho 1954), the Idaho Supreme Court followed

Sparks v. Mendoza,

83 Cal App.

2d 511,

189 P.2d 43,

45

(19481 ac:

reversed the lower court's upholding of a conveyance because
the burden of proof was not properly placed upon the grantee

-8-

1

nce a confidential relation and lack of consideration were proven by

t.he

grantor:
If a confidential relationship exists between a
grantor and grantee and there is no consideration,
a presumption of fraud and undue influence arises
shifting the burden of proof to the grantee to
show fairness and good faith in the transaction,
and upon his failure to (rebut,) the presumption of
fraud and undue influence prevails and will support
a finding that there was not a delivery of a deed.

272 P. 2d at 301.

Plaintiff herein has alleged facts and circumstances
sufficient to allow the court to find that a confidential relationship
existed.

And, of course, respondent gave no consideration for the

conveyance.

In Roberts v. Humphreys,

supra, the court said where

a confidential relation and lack of consideration were found,

2C

burden shifted onto "the one occupying .

the

the position of confidence"

requiring him "to go forward and make a full and complete disclosure
showing absolute good faith and that there was no fraud or undue
influence practiced in the transaction .

356 P.2d at 374.

The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Gosa v. Willas, 341 So.2d
t'o

699

(Ala. 1977), recently affirmed the setting aside of a deed for

undue influence upon finding a confidential relation and a dominant
spirit.

The Alabama court also noted that no consideration had been

given, and that:
For the presumption to be raised, it is not
necessary that the confidential relation be
a fiduciary relation; it is sufficient that
confidence is reposed and accepted in any
of the relations in which dominion may be
exercised by one person over another.
Id.

at 701.
The only time the grantor has the burden of proving, by

:!ear and convincing evidence,

that the grantee practiced undue

-9-
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3s1J.e 3.

largel:·

1rant<Jr' s del.ic:..=itc :ner.tal cond1t1on ar:d ::::or.f1dent:.1al

_·.nsh1µ w·1th the grantee.
JS1de of conve:·ances, even though the arantee's exercise 0f

111:

j(_'

l'lfluence

is 11m1ted to 3.n ":1onest, o'.·er-zea.:.0usness enqe::.c!ered

'd :-noc1'.'es," •,.,:here a con':ey3nce

is obta1neri

:.;i

S;Jlte cf a

,\ preswnpt1on of bad fait!: is

.1;,

eC!·...:1table b...ir:::!e:i

:__,•-' borne b'.:' the :;ran tee in such a case, because a ·'.]rarltOr ln
· lt':- state of rri1nd

is eas1

reposed.

lS

the transaction itself should be ::::on-

1s rights are to be

In Gme1ner ·:. Y'1cte,

S92 P.2d Si

C -Jurt perhaps

protected.

1Id'1ho 19791,

the elernen+:.s 3.ppl1ed

1

Gme1ner,
Jside as being induced by

,.., .J.::)

some

of conf 1dence placed :n the grantee;

lnst.J.nt

:' .:._ ·.2 .Jr,

-:ases _._,

+:.here :s evidence

b.

; 'I

.i:-i

influence

some J1m1nut1on and mental capacity;

:--> .:_

:::Jaho

that 3

a.

"_.1L'

·...

For thl:'se reasons,

and the fairness of

if the

pursuaded b·/ a ::·er son

t

.J.

t-

n :-

;_

·r,

are all

":..'i.e.;·:

i:,__,e

·:r:lr"::

0:

:=il3int1ff at <:he

and

was stealing from him.
made,

respondent was

pl31nt1ff,

in regular

plaintiff on visits to attorne:/s offi<cc

t0

and assisted and encouraged plaintiff to
on accounts.

'r"pore 3nd

Sl'Jn

•cc

banks and

chJnqP

,

During this period in which plaintiff '"'as rel";-

on respondent's recommendations,

respondent recei·:ed

remainder interests in the oil producing properties and adrn1•ej_
gave no consideration in exchange. Before plaintiffs moved
to Roosevelt in 1980, he and respondent had ver1 little conta:•
plaintiff's adopted son and grandchildren were the intended
beneficiaries and natural objects of his bountf.
the execution of the deeds to respondent,

plaintiff executed ac

affidavit reaffirming his prior will giving his propertJ •c i1s
adopted son and disallowing the deeds to respondent.
The above facts clearly establish that bad faith and
influence were practiced in the transaction between respondent o·
his older brother,

and require that the conveyance of the

question be set aside.

CONCLCSION
The court should find that cilaint1ff ·,,,as
mistake of materi3l fact

:...n >-?xecut1ng the

that the conveyance should be rescinded.
that the burden ::if proc,f

to
Th,e

in this c-ase

res;inr.der.:.,

,:ourt s:'10•1:d a:s: 'rests

J()r:r.

to rebut the presumoticn o: undue
confidential relat1onsn1p

given for the deed,
respondent's failure

:-Jhen

the
+-_'.le

..

:i.r··
1n

-;-:af"T1:_'1· ri

:..n

....

::'='s::,:::->-

oence of any undue influence or overreaching and failure to show
1tsnlote good faith require the deeds to be cancelled.
DATED THIS _!!f--oay of August,

1983.

BLACK & MOORE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
BRIEF was sent this J.f21il__aay of August, 1983, to the following:
:Ir. Herbert •..i. Gillespie
for respondent
p:, Box 1948
oocsevelt,
Utah
84066
:.1ar' B. Cohen
f,rst Security Bank of Utah N.A.
Trust Administrator
of Floyd E. Harmston
South
Street
0 .0.
Box 3007
sa:t Lake City, Utah 84111
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